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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN FINANCIAL (TAX) AND NON FINANCIAL CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING
By Ilias Bantekas* and Alexander Ezenagu**
ABSTRACT
We test the assumption as to whether financial and nonfinancial reporting by multinational corporations (MNCs) voluntarily
adhering to human rights standards are subject to ethical guidelines.
In particular, the paper finds that neither the operators of human rights
impact assessments (HRIAs) nor audited companies, at least in any
manner that is publicly detectable, impose any ethical conduct on
human rights auditors. Neither individual auditors nor human rights
audit firms have set up independent regulatory bodies that would
regulate auditors and audit firms. This has a detrimental effect on
HRIAs and the process itself. The same assumption is tested against
financial corporate reporting, specifically tax. It is found that
corporations voluntarily subjecting themselves to HRIAs do not infuse
human rights-based reporting standards into their tax audits and
neither do tax professionals. No ethical duty is prescribed by tax
auditor professional bodies or companies themselves. For the latter,
this is incongruous given that ethical tax reporting is no less a human
rights issue than any other human rights impact arising from the
operations of a corporation in the host state. The absence of ethical
audit standards in financial and non-financial human rights-related
reporting distorts both processes and produces poor outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION

Corporate due diligence, chiefly in respect of human rights
and environmental risks, is now a common feature of the operating
cycle of large corporations. Developed states are increasingly starting
to require human rights impact assessments from their
multinationals,1 particularly in respect to operations abroad. Impact
statements are also common in the work of international financial

1

See particularly UK Modern Slavery Act 2015. See ‘Guidance for Reporting
Entities’, available at: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/modernslavery-reporting-entities.pdf; Australia Modern Slavery Act 2018; Loi no. 2017-399
du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cid
Texte=JORFTEXT000034290626&categorieLien=id. For a useful English summary,
see European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ). See Business and Human Rights
Resource Centre (BHRRC) “France’s Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance: A
Practical and Multidimensional Analysis in English” at https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/frances-law-on-the-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-a-practical-andmultidimensional-analysis-in-english.
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institutions (IFIs),2 the United Nations (UN) bodies3 and the European
Union (EU),4 among others. Besides the aforementioned public
institutions, the majority of such assessments are the result of industrywide self-regulation. HRIAs required by law or the intergovernmental organizations discussed above do not demand a
particular format; at best, they set out some baseline requirements (e.g.
that in respect of indigenous persons their free, prior, and informed
consent be taken into consideration), and take it for granted that the
results are not fabricated. Where an HRIA is not demanded by a public
entity under law or contract, it is voluntary and the same is true of the
contents and format of such assessments. The majority of audits are
performed largely by for-profit commercial entities that have
established themselves as key actors in human rights and
environmental audits, including Global Reporting Initiative5 and
KPMG Banarra,6 among others. These audit firms have set up their
2

UN Doc E/C.12/2016/1 (22 July 2016) ¶¶ 4,11. See for example recent reports, UN
Doc A/HRC/31/60/Add.2 (12 January 2016), ¶¶ 81(a), 83(b). The World Bank Group
has set up quasi-judicial mechanisms, such as the Bank’s Inspection Panel and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Ombudsman, which are
competent to hear complaints concerning violations of the Bank’s internal rules, not
violations of human rights law, albeit as these arise from violations of assessments
incumbent on corporate borrowers. For an overview of the mandate and cases of the
Inspection Panel, see http:// ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Home.aspx.
3
See Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessment for Trade and
Investment Agreements, UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (19 December 2011); Guiding
Principles on extreme poverty and human rights, UN Doc A/HRC/21/39 (18 July
2012); CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24’ (10 August 2017) ¶¶ 17, 21-22; CRC
Committee, ‘General Comment 19’ UN Doc CRC/CG/19 (10 July 2016), ¶ 47.
4
‘EU Commission Working Paper Operational Guidance on taking account of
fundamental rights in Commission impact assessments’, SEC (2011) 567 Final (6 May
2011). The CJEU has, in fact, emphasized the importance of such HRIAs in the
adoption of primary and secondary EU legislation. See Schecke and Eifert v Land
Hessen, Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. HRIAs are also required
through two EU instruments, namely: The Directive on Public Procurement and the
Directive on Non-Financial Information Disclosure. Under the latter, companies with
over 500 employees are required to disclose information on policies, risks and results
as regards their respect for human rights.
5
See GRI, Sustainability Disclosure Database, https://database.globalreporting.org
(last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
6
Human Rights & Social Impact-Banarra, KPMG, https://home.kpmg/au/en/home/
services/advisory/risk-consulting/climate-change-sustainability-services/humanrights-social-impact.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
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own standardized formats and procedures for undertaking HRIAs,
although they do not necessarily see this process as a box-ticking
exercise, and hence each audit may contain different types of
information.7 Internationally recognized frameworks for sustainability
reporting include: the GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards, the
OECD Guidelines, the UNGC’s Communication on Progress,8 the
International Organization for Standardization (‘ISO’) 26000,9 and the
UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework.10 As companies vary in
their size, operations and managerial control, among others, so do
their human rights risks and the range of persons and entities affected.
Several important ethical considerations arise from the
compilation and assessment of corporate human rights risks by
external auditors.11 Chief among these is respect for participants,
informed consent, specific permission required for audio or video
recording, voluntary participation, participants right to withdraw, full
disclosure of funding sources, no harm to participants, avoidance of
undue intrusion, deception techniques, issues with anonymity,
participants’ right to check and modify a transcript, confidentiality in
respect to personal matters, data protection, enabling participation,
ethical
governance,
provision
of
grievance
procedures,
appropriateness of research methodology, full reporting of methods,
conflicts of interest, moral hazard, and duty of care. Another that is
largely ignored is that auditors either do not have, do not request, or
do not understand the relevance of data and information that is not
directly relevant to human rights risks. A typical example is corporate
forum shopping by multinational corporations (MNCs) for countries

7

Human rights audits are undertaken also by auditors in an individual capacity.
Although the discussion on ethics is pertinent to them, in all other respects this paper
deals exclusively with auditing firms.
8
Participation, United Nations Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/
participation/report (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
9
ISO 26000 Social Responsibility, ISO, https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-socialresponsibility.html(last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
10
UN Guiding Reporting Principles, https://www.ungpreporting.org (last visited Jan.
29, 2021).
11
This article will only focus on the ethical duties of external, as opposed to internal,
auditors. Internal auditors will be subject to the ethical by-laws, or codes of conduct
of their corporation, as these are further regulated by the laws of the country of
incorporation or effective seat.
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with lax tax rules and detection systems,12 or countries whose conflict
of laws rules make it impossible for grievance tort claims to be litigated
abroad.13 None of these are prima facie human rights concerns, and it
would be hard even for most lawyers to identify their linkages with
human rights.14 Yet, such forum shopping may be designed or
destined to deny future victims of corporate human rights abuses of
their right to effective access to justice, as well as fundamental socioeconomic rights as a result of poor tax collection.15 These observations
obviously raise the question as to who is best suited to carry out
HRIAs, in terms, at least, of the expertise required of auditors to carry
out their task in a way that takes into account a holistic account of
human rights risks in a manner that is independent from the audit firm
and the appointing corporation.
The role of lawyers is critical in this regard, but they are not
the key protagonists in the relevant industry.16 This observation is
12

Such a choice may be predicated, among others, on cost considerations (e.g. low or
no pension contributions; light environmental compliance; light health and safety
requirements), tax avoidance, or avoidance of public scrutiny by civil society
organizations, especially in autocratic states. See Press Release, Conference on Trade
and Development, Increasingly Complex Ownership Structures of Multinational
Enterprises Poses New Challenges for Investment Policymakers, U.N. Press Release
UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2016/016 (Jun. 21, 2016).
13
Legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, art. 4(5), art.
6(4) (Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG), Revised Draft, Jul.
16, 2019). See also Ilias Bantekas, The Linkages between Business and Human Rights
and their Underlying Causes, 43 HRQ 118 (2021).
14
Human rights linkages to trade, investment, sovereign debt, privacy and other areas
of commercial regulation or self-regulation have only been studied thoroughly in the
last two decades and are generally the domain of specialists. See Sovereign Debt And
Human Rights 169-185 (Ilias Bantekas & Cephas Lumina eds., 2018).
15
In 2019, GRI adopted, following public consultation, the GRI 207/Tax 2019
Standard, with a view to promoting tax transparency in financial audits. Like all other
standards mentioned in this article, this too is of a voluntary nature. GRI 207: Tax
2019 Fact Sheet, Global Reporting Initiative, https://www.globalreporting.org/
media/sfcpcrt4/gri-207-tax-standard-2019-factsheet.pdf?id=1616 (last visited Feb. 1,
2021). See also Ilias Bantekas, The Human Rights and Development Dimension of
Foreign Investment Laws: From Investment Laws with Human Rights to
Development-Oriented Investment Laws, 31 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 339 (2020).
16
There are no professional standards requirements for becoming a human rights
auditor. The HRIA industry providers simply require qualifications relevant to the task
undertaken and GRI views auditors as being self-regulated.
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even more compelling from the fact that human rights have been
viewed by several liberal Western states as a “tool” of non-state
(usually alleged terrorist) actors to gain benefits and avoid justice.17
However, as will be demonstrated in the case study on the ChadCameroon pipeline, HRIAs require expertise that is broader from
human rights law, such as anthropology, sociology, and others and
hence human rights auditing is not and should not be the exclusive
domain of lawyers or legal experts.
If one looks at the major international due diligence/HRIAs
initiatives, there is generally no reference to any ethical guidance or
code by which to compile and assess human rights risks, whether from
the perspective of the auditing firm or the appointed auditors. There
is a clear conflation of ethics — probably best to call it a confusion
because of the lack of ethical rules — with the compilation process and
contents of human rights audits. A good example is offered by the 2018
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business.18 Although
there is some overlap between ethics and ethical audit compilation,
there are also notable differences. The most notable is the absence of
auditor duties and responsibility. Such an outcome would be
unthinkable for lawyers and in fact there is even a growing body of
professional rules regulating lawyering before transnational and
international courts, despite the fact that: A) the statutes of these courts

17

In Holder et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al. 561 US 1, the plaintiffs had
sought to provide human rights training, advocacy and peacemaking to the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, both of which had
already been designated terrorist organisations in the USA. Under a federal US statute,
it was a crime to ‘knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organisation’. The term ‘material support’ meant, among other things, ‘training, expert
advice or assistance’. The US government construed the statute as prohibiting all types
of training to designated terrorist organisations, including human rights training that
is meant to promote non-violence within these organisations, the submission of an
amicus brief in their favour by a lawyer, as well as helping a proscribed organisation
to petition international bodies to end violent conflicts. The Supreme Court declared
that the provision of intangibles such as human rights training allowed a proscribed
organisation to free resources for other illegal purposes (fungibility), which it was in
the interests of the executive to curtail. As a result, the prohibition of free speech was
justified under the circumstances.
18
OECD Due Diligence guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, OECD,
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-ResponsibleBusiness-Conduct.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
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did not originally envisage such ethical regulation;19 and B) these rules
are not grounded in any particular legal order. The hypothesis in this
article is that there are at least three reasons for this glaring omission
of human rights auditor-specific ethical rules. The first has to do with
the fact that human rights due diligence, with the few exceptions
mentioned above, is voluntary. It is perhaps the case, therefore, that it
would dissuade companies from partaking in this voluntary process if
audits were ‘burdened’ with ethical rules. The second concerns cost
and professionalization of the HRIA business itself. The ethical
regulation of the process requires a regulated professional body, with
entry requirements similar to those demanded of lawyers and certified
accountants. Such requirements would be accompanied by higher fees,
which many companies find far too excessive for what is already a
costly voluntary exercise. Anything beyond ethical considerations
regarding the content of an HRIA would entail professionally
regulated duties for auditors themselves, which creates a paradox;
namely a voluntary process, in which the process drivers are subject to
binding regulation. The third reason concerns the freedom of auditors
to reach subjective outcomes. While some human rights risks are clear
and objective (e.g. demolition of houses and forced relocation), others
are not (e.g. impact of tax avoidance on future socio-economic rights).
It is not in the interest of human rights auditors to go out of their way
and set out ethical guidelines that would objectify outcomes.20 Where
an audit is predicated on a contractual relationship and which is in the
interest of the audit firm to be long-term, the objectivity of the audit is
questionable, where the auditors are not independent from the audit
firm. Put another way, it would be unthinkable for the state to employ
all available lawyers yet ask them to represent accused persons fairly
without confidentiality, professional privileges, or acting in their best
interest. It would equally be unthinkable to allow an inter-

19

See International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (including
International Independence Standards), Int’l Ethics Standard Bd. for Acct., 7-27 (Apr.
2018).
20
This issue is even more pressing given the discussions in the UN concerning a
business and human rights treaty. Human rights audits play a crucial role in this draft
treaty, but the ethical regulation of the industry is not discussed at all. See Ilias
Bantekas, The Emerging UN Business and Human Rights Treaty and its Codification
of International Norms, GEO. MAS. INT’L. L. J. forthcoming (2021).
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governmental trustee to use funds provided by states at the sole
discretion of the trustee and in violation of international law.21
The question of tenuous linkages is especially true since the
concept of a human rights audit is broader than an HRIA. While an
HRIA is quite focused on human rights risks, not all such risks are
encompassed within the confines of an HRIA. As already stated,
human rights auditors may simply not possess the expertise to
ascertain the linkages between a corporation’s long-term tax or conflict
of laws planning, which may ultimately produce acute human rights
impacts. Hence, if a company claims adherence to human rights
standards, such as the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises,
its human rights audit should go beyond an HRIA, but should extend
to all its other audits, particularly its financial audits. From an ethical
perspective, this means that financial auditors would be subject to the
ethical rules of their professional body for failure to identify human
rights risks.22 Besides criminal conduct, such as money laundering or
fraud,23 accountants’ ethics rules are silent on a duty to assess human
rights risks in the process of a financial audit. The same is true
regarding lawyers’ professional duties.24 As a result, despite the
likelihood of human rights risks ascertainable in financial audits, the
auditors’ ethical obligations do not extend over these. This is a
significant gap that can only be remedied either by a radical
amendment of the pertinent ethical rules, or through unilateral
undertakings by a corporation’s directors concerning the extension of
human rights assessments to financial and other audits. Both
suggestions are clearly difficult to materialize and are against the

21

See Ilias Bantekas, ‘Effective Management of International Aid through Intergovernmental Trust Funds’ (2021) 18 Loy U Chi Int’l L Rev forthcoming; Ilias
Bantekas, The Emergence of the Intergovernmental Trust in International Law, (2011)
81 BYIL 224, 231; Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Legal Personality of World Bank Funds under
International Law’, (2020) 56 Tulsa Law Review 101-143
22
Int’l Ethics Standard Bd, supra note 19.
23
Id.
24
Lawyers as gatekeepers are already burdened with a significant amount of duties, in
addition to their ethical obligations. There are no additional human rights duties on
the legal profession, other than compliance with human rights law as this applies to
legal professionals. Some feeble attempts have been made to show the role of lawyers
in the implementation of the UNGPs. See IBA Draft Guidance for Legal Professionals
on the Meaning and Implementation of the Guiding Principles (2014).
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interests of directors and pertinent professional bodies (lawyers and
accountants).
This article is organized into two main parts, each involving a
theoretical analysis, followed by a long case study. The first discusses
how the content requirements of HRIAs are conflated with the ethical
requirements of the assessment itself. This, narrow and inadequate
species of HRIA ethics is quite different from the extensive body of
legal ethics that regulates legal professionals.25 To illustrate the case,
we provide a case study of a World Bank-related impact assessment,
which gives rise to legal and non-legal ethical issues and which is
meant to demonstrate that the absence of concrete human rightscentered ethical guidelines in HRIAs can, even with the best of
intentions, lead to outcomes that effectively violate fundamental
rights. The second part examines the role of human rights-based ethics
in the financial reporting obligations of multinational corporations. If
such corporations consent to be subjected to voluntary HRIAs, then
they should have no objection infusing the same human rights
standards in the assessment of their taxes and finances. In this
connection, we examine the ethical regulation of tax professionals, and
whether their professional duties provide space for making human
rights-based tax assessments. Our findings are supported by a case
study involving MNCs in the mining sector.
2.

AUDITOR ETHICS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

Despite the variety of framework instruments employed to
carry out HRIAs, they are all predicated around some common,
inescapable features.26 These include: A) Materiality and salience, which
concerns the human rights risks that are more critical to the operations
and business relationships of the assessed corporation. No doubt, such
a definition of materiality is not only subjective, but it tells us nothing
about who decides27 what is material to a corporation, why, and most
importantly, critical to whom? The general industry understanding is
25

See J Herring, Legal Ethics (OUP 2016).
See C Ferraciolli, J Parkhomenko, ‘Addressing Human Rights Impact in
Sustainability Reporting’, in I Bantekas, MA Stein (eds), Cambridge Companion to
Business and Human Rights (Cambridge UP 2021) forthcoming.
27
Oddly enough, this is to be decided by the reporting organisation. See GRI 101:
Foundation, principle 1.1.
26
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that as far as the last question is concerned (to whom) this
encompasses primary stakeholders (materiality) and those groups or
persons most likely to be worst impacted (salience).28 B) Boundary,
which examines where human rights risks occur, or are likely to occur.
This may require, and usually does, a holistic examination of the entire
supply chain. C) Impacts, on particular individuals, communities, the
economy, the environment, sustainable development, and others.
The survey of HRIA-related instruments examined by the
authors reveal that only rarely do these instruments set out traces of
what might resemble ethical considerations on the part of the
assessors; and even then, they are not framed as ethical duties but
merely as pre-requisites for a solid, fair assessment. This is true, for
example, with respect to GRI Standards, such as ‘GRI 412: Human
Rights Assessment’. The onus there is on the reporting organization to
provide as much relevant information as possible to the auditors. This
focus on auditors making use of all available information (scoping)
and asking the right questions is evident in all assessment
frameworks.29 However, such quality controls hardly confer any
ethical duties on individual auditors or auditor organizations as they
assume that auditors are independent, skilled, and follow particular
terms of reference (ToR), that are guaranteed to produce ethical
outcomes. Exceptionally, the Danish Institute for Human Rights’
Guidance points to some ethical considerations, although it does not
frame them as such, in the form of the following questions (to
auditors):
- Is detailed information provided regarding the skills and
experience of the HRIA team, i.e. including human rights and other
necessary expertise, language skills, local knowledge, etc.? — Are
provisions made for the involvement of translators and local
interlocutors as necessary?30
28

Corporate Reporting Dialogue, Statement of Common Principles of Materiality of
the Corporate Reporting Dialogue (2016) https://corporatereportingdialogue.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Statement-of-Common-Principles-of-Materiality.pdf.
29
See Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), ‘Scoping Practitioner Supplement:
Human Rights Impact Assessment Guidance and Toolbox’, at 4-5 (2016),
https://www.humanrights.dk/business/tools/human-rights-impact-assessmentguidance-toolbox/phase-1-planning-scoping (Scroll down and click to download the
file).
30
DIHR, Human Rights Impact Assessment Guidance and Toolbox: Terms of
Reference, Practitioner Supplement, at 4 (2016), https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/
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Regarding the auditing team’s particular expertise, it poses the
following question:
- Is detailed information provided regarding the skills and
experience of the HRIA team, i.e. including human rights and other
necessary expertise, language skills, local knowledge, etc.?31
With respect to governance and reporting, the Guidance
requires that the auditing team enjoys independence and that a plan is
laid out in advance so that stakeholders can be meaningfully engaged.
- Is the governance structure for the HRIA clearly outlined, i.e.
the role and independence of the HRIA team, the role of the company
contact(s) and counter-part(s) (both at headquarters and subsidiarylevel), the role of any advisory panel or peer review mechanism etc.?
- Are the requirements for reporting clearly stipulated,
including publication of the HRIA report, but also other modes of
reporting back to rights-holders and other stakeholders regarding the
impact assessment findings (e.g. community meeting involving those
who participated as well as the impact assessment team and company
to share and discuss findings and mitigation measures to be
implemented; reporting back to rights-holders through the company
community liaison officers etc.)?32
It is clear that all the HRIA Standards purposely conflate due
diligence requirements expected of audits and auditors with ethics.
This is, however, achieved at the expense of any ethical duties of
auditors towards the stakeholders for whom the audit is performed,
nor indeed in observance of an ethical code of conduct. That the audit
should comply with some requirements that, if applied to individuals,
would have resembled ethical duties is irrelevant because the nonobservance of such requirements does not necessarily invalidate the
HRIA and at best may constitute a breach of contract by the auditing
firm against the reporting organization. Ethical duties may well be
imposed or assumed unilaterally even in the absence of a
regulatory/professional body, whether unilaterally, by contract or by
reference to a pertinent code of conduct. Concerned stakeholders,
humanrights.dk/files/media/dokumenter/business/hria_toolbox/phase_1/phase_1_tor
_prac_sup_final_jan2016.pdf.
31
Id.; see also OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
(2018), particularly Q26 at 67, which addresses the qualities of auditors on the basis
of qualifications and skills, without mentioning any ethical duties.
32
Id.
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including civil society organizations (CSOs) would be able to point out
violations of ethical rules with a view to demonstrating whether the
outcomes of a particular HRIA have been tarnished by bias or other
unethical conduct, or whether they are contrary to the fundamental
teachings of a relevant discipline.
Non-lawyers working on or interested in HRIAs may find the
discussion on ethical regulation of little practical significance perhaps
even a luxury. To understand why this is not so, it is perhaps
instructive to briefly examine the key justifications for the regulation
of lawyers, namely: the cynical, the client protection, and the public
interest perspectives. In one of the major reviews of the legal profession
in England and Wales in 2004, Sir David Clementi identified the roles
justifying regulation of the legal profession, namely: access to justice,
maintenance of the rule of law, protection of consumer interests,
promotion of healthy competition among well trained lawyers, and
promotion of a public understanding of citizen’s rights.33 Readers will
not fail to realize that some of these objectives are central to HRIAs,
particularly rule of law, consumer (as well as investor) interests, and
enhanced stakeholder participation. It is, therefore, important that
auditors be subject to some degree of regulation. Unlike lawyers
whose direct duties are owed to their clients, however, human rights
auditors’ duties have never seriously been defined. While it is true that
they owe client-like duties to the corporations that have contracted
their services, the function of said services are not to simply act in the
best interests of their client, but to assist the client in conforming with
its human rights commitments. This is different to the nature of duties
owed by lawyers. Even so, given the wider public interest function of
HRIAs, just like the legal profession, human rights auditors can only
serve said public interest if subject to some regulation, not least
because of the benefits of regulated professions34 as articulated in the
beginning of this paragraph by reference to the legal profession.
33

See D Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England
and Wales: Final Report, at 15-17 (2004), http://www.avocatsparis.org/Presence_
Internationale/Droit_homme/PDF/Rapport_Clementi.pdf.
34
See Austin Sarat, The Profession versus the Public Interest: Reflections on Two
Reifications, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1491 (2002); see also Institute of Chartered Accountants
for England and Wales (ICAEW), Acting in the Public Interest: A Framework for
Analysis (2012) (provides helpful insights while being skeptical that it may be used as
a smokescreen for advocating in one’s self-interest).
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There are several models of regulation for the professions and
it is assumed in this article that human rights auditing is indeed a
profession.35 These models consist of: rules-based, enforced by a
regulatory body; outcomes-based, which relies significantly on personal
discretion to achieve fair outcomes (premised on consequentialism
and rule-consequentialism); self-enforcement, where the profession
develops ethical rules and procedures that must meet the approval of
a regulator; and competitive regulation, which is grounded on enhanced
regulation following consultation with the profession.36 Although it is
not suggested here that human rights auditors undergo the extensive
regulation of the legal profession,37 or that in the absence of
transnational regulation states should regulate territorially,38 the
industry itself should move towards the adoption of common ethical
rules and self-regulation that encompasses all stakeholders in one way
or another.
Self-regulation is fundamental to the organization of industries
across borders, such as the banking, construction, and other sectors,
although none set out ethical criteria for work undertaken, nor do they
serve as regulatory bodies.39 The key reason is that they are not meant
to regulate a profession or the conduct of professionals. It is assumed
that professionals, e.g. lawyers and accountants, will be subject to the
ethical rules of the territorial state. It is uncommon for a professional
activity to not be subject to ethical regulation in any jurisdiction and
yet, like in the present instance, to raise so many ethical issues. While
industry-based self-regulation offers no paradigms of professional
regulation, international entities, particularly courts and tribunals,
have discovered that although their drafters made no reference to the
ethical regulation of legal professionals (counsel, judges, prosecutors),
35

See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions (1998); see also European Union
Directive 2005/36/EC on Recognition of Professional Qualifications (defines liberal
professions as “those practiced on the basis of relevant professional qualifications in
a personal, responsible and professionally independent capacity by those providing
intellectual and conceptual services in the interest of the client and the public”).
36
Herring, supra note 25, at 76.
37
Id. at 77-9.
38
This would turn out to be disastrous, as it would allow for forum shopping in the
less regulated jurisdictions.
39
This is different to the ethical regulation of the industries and their employees under
domestic laws, e.g. UK Chartered Bankers Institute. See F Bell, Culture, Conduct and
Ethics in Banking: Principles and Practice (Kogan Page 2018).
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it was important that such regulation be provided through broad
consultation with direct participants.40 The same is also true of
international commercial arbitration, where several empirical studies
have shown a consistency among counsel as to the acute ethical issues,
such as delay and guerrilla tactics.41 Arbitration resembles human
rights auditing because persons appearing as counsel on behalf of
parties need not be lawyers and are not regulated by the bar
(professional legal association) of the seat of arbitration. Unlike ethical
codes for arbitrators there is no equivalent for counsel, even though
the IBA adopted in 2011 a set of Principles on Conduct for the Legal
Profession. However, these Principles apply to all types of legal
proceedings and has not yet received universal approval.42 Some
arbitral institutions have drafted relevant guidelines, such as the
London Court of International Arbitration’s (LCIA) General
Guidelines for the Parties’ Legal Representatives which are binding on
the parties – and by implication their legal representatives – because
they are an integral part of their arbitration rules which are binding on
the parties, but not their legal representatives. The parties are obliged
to ensure that their representatives have agreed to comply as a
condition of representation.43 Although in practice tribunals are
reluctant to remove counsel for improper behavior, they possess an
inherent right to both rebuke and remove in situations where they
threaten the integrity and operation of proceedings.44 Advanced
jurisdictions, such as New York, have begun a trend whereby counsel
40

Int’l Ethics Standard Bd., supra note 19, at 7-27.
Edna Sussman & Solomon Ebere, All’s Fair in Love and War, 22 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 611, 614-15 (2011) (discussing a survey of international arbitration counsel here
a significant number of respondents reported experiencing unfair guerilla tactics in
arbitration proceedings). Ethical gaps are evident in processes driven by states or
powerful non-state actors, such as the World Bank, against weak, fragile or distressed
states. See Ilias Bantekas, R Vivien, ‘The Odiousness of Greek Debt in Light of the
Findings of the Greek Debt Truth Committee’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 539;
Ilias Bantekas, ‘A Human Rights-Based Arbitral Tribunal for Sovereign Debt’, (2018)
29 American Review of International Arbitration 52.
42
See Catherine A. Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford Univ. Press
2014).
43
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Arbitration Rules Art. 18.5
(3d ed. 2020), www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules2020.aspx#Article%2018.
44
See Id. at art. 18.6.
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is sanctioned for frivolous applications to set aside awards.45 It is
beyond the scope of this narrow article to analyze the precise contours
of a possible regulatory framework for human rights auditors.
The pitfalls in the absence of ethical rules and professional
responsibility for auditors undertaking HRIAs will become evident in
the following section on the work of the World Bank. Some scholars
have gone as far as arguing that HRIAs constitute a
‘governmentalization’ of human rights, where ‘the individual
diminishes as a source of concern and certainly as an active agent and
is replaced by a primary focus among the powerful on monitoring,
measuring, and manipulating the population for benign ends.’46
3.

ETHICS IN WORLD BANK POLICIES ON INDIGENOUS PERSONS

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) is a member of the World Bank Group (Group). The IBRD does
not undertake broad HRIAs, albeit it requires that borrowers execute
relevant operational policies (OP) in the implementation of the funded
project. In the execution of some policies, e.g. with regards to
indigenous people or relocation, social and environmental impact
assessments are necessary. Only content-related guidance is offered
for these by the IBRD’s OP, as well as perhaps some foundational
principles, and hence the borrower is free to establish terms of
reference with an ethical dimension. Since 1991, the World Bank has
required borrowers to mitigate any adverse effects from the financed
project on indigenous populations.47 To this end it has devised a
layered process that is designed not only to protect indigenous peoples
but also to enhance their developmental advancement. This is
important because, in theory, the Bank is in an ideal position to
implement indigenous rights since both the investor and the local
government are dependent upon its approval of the loan. The Bank’s
OP 4.10 on indigenous peoples requires the borrower to engage in a
45

DigiTelCom, Ltd v Tele2 Sverige AB, 12 Civ 3082 (S.D. N.Y., 2012).
D McGrogan, The Population and the Individual: The Human Rights Audit as the
Governmentalization of Global Human Rights Governance, 16 Int’l Con Law 1703
(2019).
47
See Ilias Bantekas, Sociological Concerns Arising from World Bank Projects and
their Impact on Sub-Saharan Indigenous Peoples, 1 INT’L J. OF L IN CONTEXT 143,
145-50 (2005).
46
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process of ‘free, prior, and informed consultation’, also known as FPIC
(which is now part of customary international law) with the affected
indigenous group. FPIC must yield ‘broad community support’ for the
project in order for it to be financed.48 This is subject to a five-prong
process, which consists of the following:
1.
Screening by the Bank to identify whether indigenous
peoples are present in, or have collective attachment to, the project
area;49
2.
A social assessment by the borrower;50
3.
A process of free, prior, and informed consultation
with the affected indigenous peoples’ communities at each stage of the
project, and particularly during project preparation, to fully identify
their views and ascertain their broad community support for the
project;51
4.
The preparation of an indigenous peoples’ plan (IPP)
or an indigenous peoples’ planning framework (IPPF);52 and
5.
Disclosure of the draft IPP or draft IPPF.53
In the screening process the Bank, or the borrower, seeks to
determine the existence of indigenous people in the project area and
their attachment to it. To this end, it consults qualified social scientists,
particularly anthropologists with expertise in the project area. In
addition, the Bank also consults the indigenous group and the
borrower.54 Where the Bank determines the existence of indigenous
peoples, it is then incumbent on the borrower to undertake a social
assessment study to evaluate the project’s effects. Where potentially
negative effects are detected the social impact assessment (SIA) must
propose alternative measures. The SIA, which is a much narrower
HRIA, may determine the impact on variables, such as community
structures and institutions, changes in social behavior, local norms,
customs and activities, changes in social control mechanisms, creation
48

Para. 1, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10 (as revised in April 2013).
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8.
50
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9.
51
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 10–11.
52
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12–13.
53
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 15.
54
This is chiefly in order to localize indigenous rights, rather than offer general
solutions, which may be alien or impractical. See Eleni Polymenopoulou, Localizing
Intellectual Property and UNESCO Claims, 6 CAN. J. OF HUM. RTS. 87 (2017).
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of employment opportunities, and others. It is not untypical of
borrowers in general – and governments for that matter – to
manipulate the SIA as a political rather than as a planning tool. This
may be done in order to justify a particular policy, rather than as a tool
to mitigate the effects of the policy on the affected population. The
Bank’s only guarantee against manipulation is the consensus of the
affected people, which itself is subject to manipulation, as will be
demonstrated in the following section. Further, the borrower may well
demonstrate an increase in income in respect to the group’s
households, which he may then interpret as a determinant in the rise
of livelihood. In many cases, this increase is artificial since it is the
result of lump sum compensations paid to affected persons whose
effects are of a limited duration.55
Following the drafting of the
social assessment plan, the borrower must next engage in direct
consultation with the indigenous peoples on the basis of three
principles: (1) an appropriate gender and inter-generationally
inclusive framework encompassing broad civil society representation;
(2) employment of appropriate consultation methods to the cultural
and social values of the affected people, with special attention to the
concerns of women, youth, and children, and their access to
development opportunities; and (3) providing full access and
disclosure to the relevant reports and information.56 Before the Bank
can go ahead and approve the loan, the borrower must demonstrate
that the project has received broad community support on the basis of
the FPIC.57 It is natural, however, at this stage for the affected group
55

As a result, Ashley and Hussein emphasize that poverty reduction is not necessarily
reflected in a sudden increase of income, but should be approached from a study of
food security, vulnerability, social inferiority, access to productive means and an
understanding of the objectives of each household (i.e. in the sense of what is
important to them – education for their children, land security, etc. C. Ashley and K.
Hussein, Developing Methodologies for Livelihood Impact Assessment: Experience of
the African Wildlife Foundation in East Africa (Overseas Development Institute
Working Paper 129, 2000), 14.
56
OP 4.10, supra note 48, at ¶ 10.
57
This is not a mere condition imposed by the Bank. Rather, it has been endorsed as
a customary principle by human rights treaty bodies in relation to the taking of
indigenous lands, whatever their form of land tenure. See Poma Poma v. Peru,
(HRCtee) (2009), ¶ 7.6; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), Concluding Observations on Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/Add.1/74 (30
November 2001), ¶ 33; Dann, Mary and Carrie, (IACHR) (2002), ¶ 131.
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and civil society organizations to barter with the borrower for further
concessions, knowing full well that their agreement is necessary for the
continuation of the project. This is certainly welcome, because it
ensures that indigenous concerns are voiced and heard throughout the
process and that indigenous social and cultural demands are met, even
if the local government is opposed to them. Any special agreement
must be communicated by the borrower to the Bank.58
On the basis of the social assessment and in consultation with
the affected communities, the borrower prepares an IPP that sets out
appropriate measures ensuring that the affected group will receive
culturally appropriate social and economic benefits and that any
adverse effects are avoided, mitigated, or compensated.59 The role of
civil society in the consultation process is critical, because indigenous
peoples’ access to information and their level of education may lend
itself to manipulation by the borrower. By way of illustration, in the
absence of civil society the borrower may paint an idyllic picture of the
project without emphasizing any of its social and environmental evils.
Equally, the borrower may attempt to negotiate only with persons of
influence and thus ignore the community’s broader aspirations.
It has not always been abundantly clear in the Bank’s policies
on indigenous peoples whether its focus should be directed at
preserving the group’s cultural and social status quo, or whether it
should also be open to the possibility that the group may wish to
radically alter this traditional status. Paragraph 7 of Operational
Directive 4.20 of 1991, which has now been replaced by OP 4.10, raised
this issue as a dilemma for Bank management as follows:
How to approach indigenous peoples affected by development
projects is a controversial issue. Debate is often phrased as a choice
between two opposed positions. One pole is to insulate indigenous
populations whose cultural and economic practices make it difficult
for them to deal with powerful outside groups. The advantages of this
approach are the special protections that are provided and the
preservation of cultural distinctiveness; the costs are the benefits
forgone from development programmes. The other pole argues that
indigenous people must be acculturated to dominant society values
and economic activities so that they can participate in national
58
59

OP 4.10, supra note 48, at ¶ 11(e).
Id. at ¶ 1.
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development. Here the benefits can include improved social and
economic opportunities, but the cost is often the gradual loss of
cultural differences.
Paragraph 1 of OP 4.10 addresses this issue by requiring that
all Bank-financed projects impart culturally appropriate social and
economic benefits. The Policy goes even further by stressing that the
Bank may, at a country’s request, support development policies that
help to strengthen local laws in favour of indigenous groups, set up
poverty-reduction programmes and projects owned by indigenous
peoples, as well as address gender and intergenerational issues,60
among others.
The ethical implications up to this point of the exercise are
immense since there is no guarantee that the borrower’s auditors are
independent, free of any conflicts, possess sufficient expertise, or are
subject to any control regarding the best possible culturally sensitive
suggestion.61 Unlike HRIAs, a SIA of this nature determines the
livelihood of an indigenous group, including policy questions on
relocation and displacement. Even so, the Bank provides no ethical
guidance to the borrower and its auditors. One is at pains to find any
ethical regulation of external auditors whatsoever. The Bank’s Ethics
and Conduct Business Department62 is only concerned with intra-bank
ethical conduct (i.e., of its employees)63 and does not attempt to
address any of the ethical issues identified above.
In practice, this process is expensive and cumbersome for
borrowers and to a certain degree intrusive for the target states.
Moreover, vulnerable and marginalized indigenous groups are
typically exploited for their labor and lands by local elites, including
timber and natural resources corporations, non-indigenous farmers,
and corrupt local government officials. Thus, there are many actors
who are averse, if not outright hostile, to the enhancement of the status
60

WORLD BANK GROUP, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL,
Operational Directive 4.20: Indigenous Peoples (1991), at http://wbln0018.
worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/0/0F7D6F3F04DD703
98525672C007D08ED?OpenDocument.
61
See David Calvey, The Art and Politics of Covert Research: Doing ‘Situated Ethics’
in the Field, (Sociology, 2008).
62
Ethics and Business Conduct Department, The World Bank, https://www.
worldbank.org/en/about/unit/ethics_and_business_conduct (last updated Nov. 20,
2020).
63
Id.

286

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 28

of indigenous peoples, in terms of legal, social, and financial status.
Hence, the Bank should not simply strive to accept an IPP because it
has received broad consensus from the indigenous group in the project
area. Rather, it must make every effort to eliminate any possible
hostility against the group following the completion of the project and
avoid the temptation of temporary financial benefits.
In the late 1990s, the Group proceeded to provide US $115
million towards financing the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project, which
was meant to transport Chadian oil to the Cameroonian coast. The
construction of the Cameroon portion of the pipeline was to traverse
the country’s Atlantic forest zone, part of which is inhabited by the
Baka/Bakola indigenous peoples. These groups are also known as
pygmies, but the term carries a pejorative connotation, and the Bakola
themselves do not accept it, despite the fact that it appears heavily in
the literature.64 They maintain a traditional lifestyle that is distinct not
only from that of the general population of Cameroon, but also from
neighboring tribal and semi-tribal peoples.65 Unlike other groups they
are principally engaged in hunting, trapping, and fishing, and only
recently began to cultivate as an alternative;66 yet, farming is only of
secondary financial importance to them not only because of their
cultural identity, but also because they are not land owners.67
The traversal of the pipeline through traditional Baka/Bakola
lands gave rise to two interrelated issues. The first concerned the social
impact of the project on this community, whereas the second involved
the potential realignment of inter-ethnic relations with neighboring
groups and the state itself. The IPP foresaw that the project would
bring progress to the area and proposed both individual and collective
64

See CS Abega, Pygmées Baka, Le Droit à la Différence (Presses de l’Université
Catholique d’Afrique Centrale 1998).
65
See Ngambouk Vitalis Pemounta, Forest Conservation, Wildlife Preservation and
the Baka Pygmies of Southeast Cameroon, 84 GeoJournal 1035 (2019).
66
See Koji Hayashi, Hunting Activities in Forest Camps Among The Baka HunterGatherers of Southeastern Cameroon, African Study Monographs, 29(2): 73-92 (Jul.
2008).
67
Such a lifestyle has given rise to a distinct scholarly literature that seeks to determine
the conservationist role of indigenous communities. See Janis B. Alcorn, Indigenous
Peoples and Conservation, Vol. 7 No. 2 Conservation Biology (Jun. 1993); Serge
Bahuchet, Spatial Mobility and Access to the Resources Among the African Pygmies,
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compensation which consisted of the construction of huts and the
provision of tools and compensation for destroyed crops and
farmland. There was also provision of a limited supply of electricity,
access to health care, and education.
The project was bound to disrupt the Baka/Bakola traditional
lifestyle, given that the pipeline was destined to pass through
forestland used for their principal activities of hunting and crop
gathering. Such an eventuality would necessarily have entailed
relocation within a more confined forest space or adjustment to
agriculture as the Baka/Bakola exclusive livelihood. Both alternatives
involved some social adaptation whose consequences the borrowers
and the Bank failed to address. The most serious problem was that of
land ownership. Under Cameroonian law, customary title to land has
been available since 1974 as long as the land is occupied or exploited.68
Land is deemed occupied where the user has constructed buildings
and dwellings, whereas exploitation is demonstrated in cases of
farming and grazing. The guiding principle for customary title to be
granted is therefore a ‘man’s clear control of the land and evident
development.’69 Given the Bakola’s hunting and crop gathering
livelihood, they can never expect to possess any customary law rights
under the existing law. They fare no better in Cameroon’s forests. The
law there distinguishes between non-permanent forest domains,
which may be converted for agricultural use, and permanent forest
domains that are reserved for conservation.70 Forest laws have
imposed severe restrictions on Bakola hunting and crop gathering
rights because forest products are limited only to personal use.
Moreover, because the Bakola do not technically ‘occupy’ or ‘exploit’
converted forestland they have never been able to claim any pertinent
rights. This has driven the Baka/Bakola to poverty because they
traditionally barter with wild game and forest crops, which is their
primary source of income. Moreover, it has forced them to become
68

See Samuel Nguiffo, Pierre Ètienne Kenfack, and Nadinee Mballa, L’incidence des
lois foncières historiques et modernes sur les droits fonciers des communautés locales
et autochtones du Cameroun. Forest Peoples Programme (2009). Available at:
www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2010/05/cameroonlandrightsstudy
09fr.pdf.
69
Cameroon, Ord. No. 74–1, art. 15(1) (July 6, 1974) (laying out the land tenure
system).
70
Nguiffo, supra note 68, at 13-17.
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subservient to other groups which have acquired land ownership.
Equally, although Cameroonian law envisages annual proceeds from
a logging tax that are to be distributed to local village communities, in
practice the Baka/Bakola are excluded by rival groups because they
are not recognized as having resident status.71
As a result of the legal impediments restricting their primary
(hunting and crop-gathering) and secondary (agriculture and farming)
financial activities, the Bakola have become subservient to neighboring
groups, namely certain Bantu tribes.72 This situation has been
exacerbated by the fact that the Bantu are farmers, and therefore have
come to own land. This stark inequality between the two groups has
not been addressed by Cameroon, despite the obvious vulnerability of
the Bakola and has led many of them to be considered Bantu serfs. This
inequality has curtailed the Bakola’s access to markets to sell or barter
their forest products, which has in turn forced them to barter with the
Bantu who naturally exploit them. Neither the borrowers nor the Bank
thought it wise to alter their subservient and serf (economic and social)
status, despite the fact that they desired to escape this cycle of
exploitation through the acquisition of land, educating their children
and improving their standard of living, while retaining much of their
traditional lifestyle. Without delaying the project the Bank should, in
similar circumstances, oblige the host state to accept legislative
changes alleviating the subservient condition of vulnerable people. In
the instant case, this could have been achieved by granting the Bakola
land rights and rendering them recipients of the logging tax.
3.1

ETHICAL ISSUES NOT CONSIDERED BY THE WORLD BANK

This SIA clearly necessitated expertise in both land law
(customary and other), as well as anthropology of the Baka/Bakola.
Paragraph 8 of OP 4.20 simply requires the ‘technical judgment of
qualified social scientists with expertise on the social and cultural
71

Centre for Environment and Development (CED) Réseau Recherches Actions
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groups in the project area.’ While the presence of customary law
experts was crucial, they were viewed as irrelevant.73 That
anthropologists are called upon to provide judgment on ‘poverty
reduction,’ ‘sustainable development,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘social and
economic benefits that are culturally appropriate and gender and
inter-generationally inclusive,’74 is absurd. This is not only far beyond
their expertise, but calls into question judgments of a personal nature
that are not subject to further control.75 It is not even clear how
anthropologists can evaluate and ensure FPIC under the particular
circumstances of their mandate. The SIA did not, to the best of our
knowledge, specify if the auditors were compelled to follow a
particular set of ethical guidelines. In fact, this is something the World
Bank itself could require in its operational policies with borrowers.
In the case at hand, there are numerous codes of conduct,
including those adopted in 2012 by the American Anthropological
Association (AAA),76 as well as the 2009 International Association of
Impact Assessment.77 The literature has identified several ethical
issues in SIAs, and by extension HRIAs,78 conducted by
anthropologists and social scientists, namely:
respect for participants, informed consent, specific permission
required for audio or video recording, voluntary participation,
participant right to withdraw, full disclosure of funding sources, no
73

This is inexcusable, given that culture has become an inextricable aspect of
international law and hence cannot be excluded from SIAs or other assessments
involving people. See Eleni Polymenopoulou, Cultural Rights in the Case Law of the
International Court of Justice, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 447 (2014).
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harm to participants, avoidance of undue intrusion, no use of
deception, the presumption and preservation of anonymity,
participant right to check and modify a transcript, confidentiality of
personal matters, data protection, enabling participation, ethical
governance, provision of grievance procedures, appropriateness of
research methodology, full reporting of methods … conflict of interest,
moral hazard and duty of care.79
4.
IN

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS ETHICS
TAX REPORTING

In our analysis of HRIAs, it became evident that while human
rights auditors apply standardized formats to the audits, there is no
use of ethical codes or guidelines and, because this is an unregulated
profession, there exists no professional body to monitor the ethical
conduct of the auditors. This is detrimental to the legitimacy of human
rights auditing. This second part of the paper seeks to ascertain to what
degree ethics play a part in financial reporting, with a focus on tax
reporting. Tax reporting is different in at least two ways with regards
to human rights reporting/auditing. Firstly, tax professionals, chiefly
certified accountants and lawyers, are subject to ethical rules as part of
their profession, whether nationally or internationally.80 Secondly, tax
reporting is not voluntary, but part of a mandatory process for all
corporate entities. What is unique about the linkage between corporate
tax reporting and human rights is that the same corporations that
subject themselves to voluntary HRIAs should, in theory, accept the
same human rights standards in their tax reporting as they do in their

79
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non-financial reporting.81 After all, if a corporation agrees to become
human rights compliant, surely this encompasses all its operations,
including its tax conduct.82
If this is the case, then corporations should accept or infuse
HRIA standards in their tax reporting. However, to the best
knowledge of the authors, there is no ‘standard’ in the sense described
in the first part of this paper, whether designed by a human rights
auditor or other that is currently available for use by MNCs and other
corporations. Were such a ‘standard’ to be adopted by an auditor, such
as KPMG or GRI, it might have the undesired effect of MNCs choosing
not to undergo any further voluntary human rights reporting, for fear
of double and unethical standards applied to their reporting. Ethics
plays, or should play, a significant part in tax reporting, far more than
in human rights reporting. Tax auditors/professionals, in balancing
their duty of care to their clients and states, generally strive to report
by reference to what is legal under the laws of the territorial state. As
is shown elsewhere, legality in this sense is tantamount to taking
advantage of means and processes in the law to achieve the greatest
degree of tax avoidance. However, if a corporation prides itself in
being human rights compliant, tax legality hardly suffices. Tax
practices such as the “permissible” erosion of tax bases and shifting of
profits to other jurisdictions through creative tax planning and
reporting,83 while generally legal under particular circumstances, lack
ethical value where they strip a poor, developing, nation and its people
81
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from much-needed tax revenues. Such practices are clearly antithetical
to the values espoused by the same corporation in its non-financial
reporting, wherein it may proclaim its adherence to human rights and
the SDGs, among others.
It is, therefore, imperative that non-financial and financial
reporting be subject to similar, if not identical, human rights standards,
even if through distinct reporting processes. Several benchmarks and
pre-requisites must first be put in place. In the absence of formal state
laws, corporations must unilaterally infuse ethical human rightsrelated standards when they order their tax affairs. This must be
expressly recorded in their internal instruments and by-laws and
pertinent instructions be provided to their tax consultants and
auditors. Ideally, tax professionals must, through their regulatory
bodies, assume an ethical duty to report beyond the principle of
legality, but in such a manner that a corporate tax audit is human
rights and SDG-compliant. Both authors agree that we are far from
such an eventuality, as it is fiercely resisted by tax professionals, their
regulatory bodies, and corporations. In all likelihood it would also be
resisted by industrialized states because a significant amount of
revenues that would otherwise be repatriated (and re-invested in the
home state) would necessarily remain in developing host states. It is
clear, therefore, that in order for ethical tax reporting to occur it
behooves MNCs, whether individually or collectively, to adopt ethical
standards in their tax reporting and instruct their tax consultants to
adhere to these standards.
5.

ETHICAL ISSUES IN TAX PLANNING AND REPORTING

Increasingly, the role of taxes in achieving the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) has been recognized in recent literature.84
Some SDGs are intrinsically tied to the enjoyment and exercise of
human rights bestowed on persons both by international law and
applicable national laws. This linkage between taxation and the SDGs
has seen long-needed global attention on the international tax system
and the activities of tax practitioners. Tax justice advocates have, for
84
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years, beamed the light on the activities of multinational enterprises to
take advantage of gaps in tax treaties and national laws to erode tax
bases and shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions or countries with
preferential tax regimes. The professionals behind these schemes have
also come under scrutiny and reprobation. The Paradise Papers
chronicle the activities of MNEs and tax practitioners who scheme to
take advantage of tax systems, and their global network.85
However, a debate which has been around for decades is
which activities of MNEs and tax practitioners are condemnable, and
which are permissible, even if not necessarily praised. This debate has
often led to the division of these scheming activities into tax avoidance
and tax evasion. The definition and treatment of tax evasion would
appear straightforward. Tax evasion is understood by all as the willful,
illegal activities of persons to not pay taxes or dues or to pay a lower
sum.86 Tax evasion denotes fraudulent declarations or intentional acts
of non-declaration of tax returns by persons that owe taxes in a
jurisdiction.87 Tax avoidance presents a more difficult situation.88
Agreeing on the scope of tax avoidance presents great conflict
for all stakeholders, whether holding the position of a tax authority,
tax practitioner, tax justice advocate, or by-stander. Steenkamp
characterizes tax avoidance “by open and full disclosure, where a
taxpayer has arranged affairs in a perfectly legal manner so that he has
either reduced his income or has no income on which tax is payable.”89
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Diaz-Berrio, offering a more expansive definition, defines tax
avoidance as, “although legal, involves the abusive exploitation of
loopholes in national and international laws that allows multinational
corporations ((MNCs) to shift profits from country to country, often to
or through tax havens with the intention of reducing the amount of
taxes they pay.”90 Oguttu sees tax avoidance by MNEs, as the use of
gaps in the “interaction between different tax systems to reduce
taxable income artificially or shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions in
which little or no economic activity is performed.”91 She views it as the
use of legal methods to arrange one’s affairs in order to pay less tax.
This, according to Oguttu, is achieved by “using loopholes in tax laws
and exploiting them within legal parameters.”92
Given the overwhelming support for tax avoidance by tax
practitioners, one is forced to question where the support for tax
avoidance emanated from? As far back as 1935 in the case of Inland
Revenue Commissioners (“IRC”) v. Duke of Westminster (“The Duke of
Westminster Doctrine”),93 Lord Tomlin had held, to wit:
Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so as that
the tax attaching under the appropriate acts is less than it otherwise
would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result,
then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue
or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be
compelled to pay an increased tax.
This judgment in Duke of Westminster re-echoed an earlier
decision in Partington v. Attorney-General where Lord Cairns ruled:
As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this:
If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he
must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial
mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax,
cannot bring the subject within the matter of the law, the subject is free,
however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might
otherwise appear to be.94
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These decisions lend support to persons and tax practitioners
to creatively order their affairs to pay minimum tax. Though, it would
appear that these decisions in the Duke of Westminster’s case and the
Partington’s case have been departed from by subsequent decisions of
courts, even though they remain the biggest support for taxable
persons and tax practitioners. In England, in the case of W.T. Ramsay
Ltd. v. IRC,95 clearly departing from the Duke of Westminster doctrine,
the House of Lords decided that
. . . while the techniques of tax avoidance progress and are
technically improved, the courts are not obliged to stand still.” The
court held that to “force the courts to adopt, in relation to closely
integrated situations, a step by step, dissecting approach which the
parties themselves may have negated, would be a denial rather than
an affirmation of the true judicial process. . ..
This approach by the English court was recently followed in
the Tanzanian case of African Barrick Gold Plc96 by Tanzanian Tax
Revenue Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).
For tax practitioners and taxable persons, complying with and
implementing tax laws present ethical dilemma. Particularly, for tax
practitioners, balancing the duty owed to the client and the duty owed
to the society walls one into a difficult space. For taxable persons, the
enjoyment of one’s private property—a tenet of one’s fundamental
human rights—persuades one to order one’s affairs to pay as little or
no tax, as legally permissible.
This section discusses the ethical issues in tax planning and tax
reporting by tax practitioners. It focuses on tax practitioners who
represent corporate entities.
5.1. Tax Practitioners
The network of tax practitioners includes tax accountants and
lawyers, bankers, auditors, and regulators, who interact with taxation
at different levels. Hereunder, we consider the ethical dilemma of tax
lawyers and accountants who advise clients on ordering their tax
affairs and, in many instances, implement the advice on behalf of the
clients. To help discuss the ethical dilemmas tax lawyers and
95
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accountants deal with, we introduce a case study as anecdotal
evidence of the outcome of tax advisory.
5.1.1. African Barrick Gold Plc v Commissioner General,
Tanzania Revenue Authority97
In African Barrick Gold Plc. v. Commissioner General, Tanzania
Revenue Authority,98 the Tribunal held that African Barrick Gold Plc.
(ABG) failed to withhold taxes from payment of dividends to its
offshore shareholders and engaged in tax evasion.99 ABG is a United
Kingdom-incorporated company, whose majority shareholder is
Barrick Gold Corporation100, a Canadian company registered on the
Toronto Stock Exchange.101 ABG has subsidiaries in Tanzania and
elsewhere. However, as reported by the judgment, only its Tanzanian
subsidiaries were actively engaged in business at the time.102 In 2012,
the Tanzanian Revenue Authority opened an inquiry into the tax
position of ABG, determined that it was resident in Tanzania for tax
purposes, and concluded that it was required to withhold tax on
dividends paid to its shareholders. The revenue authority’s position
was that since only the Tanzanian subsidiaries were engaged in
business, ABG’s dividend distribution must have come from the
profits of these Tanzanian subsidiaries. The Tanzanian subsidiaries
had all declared losses for the same period (years 2010, 2011, 2012, and
2013) in which ABG distributed the dividends in question.
ABG, in its defense, stated that the dividends paid to its
shareholders for the period were paid from “distributable reserves
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created after reduction of the appellant’s capital and IPO proceeds”103
and not from the undeclared profits of its three subsidiaries in
Tanzania. On the issue of tax residence, ABG argued that it was not tax
resident in Tanzania, since to be tax resident in Tanzania, a company
had to be incorporated or formed under the laws of Tanzania.104 ABG
argued that the words “incorporated” and “formed” meant the same
thing and as such, a company had to be incorporated in Tanzania to be
tax resident.105 Relying on the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary
(8th edition) and the Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edition), ABG called
for the literal interpretation of the words “incorporated” and
“formed”106 to give both the same meaning.
The Tribunal rejected both claims by ABG. On the issue of tax
residence, the Tribunal, adopting a purposive approach rule in
construction of statutes,107 held that the word, “formed” must be
construed to include the registration of the company under the Act.
The Tribunal further held that, given that ABG had obtained a
Certificate of Compliance, pursuant to section 453 of the Companies
Act of Tanzania, ABG was duly formed in Tanzania as a foreign
company, and as such was tax resident.
On the issue of payment of dividends, the Tribunal held that it
was inconceivable that ABG could pay out significant dividends to its
shareholders over four consecutive years when its only assets
consisted of the three loss-making entities incorporated in Tanzania,
which had themselves declared losses and paid no dividends to
ABG.108 Agreeing with the submission of the revenue authority, the
Tribunal held that the “transactions were simply a design created by
the appellant aimed at tax evasion. . . .”109 Though the judgment did
not provide details of the transactions between ABG and its
subsidiaries, it could be referring to a common tax planning structure
where subsidiaries in high tax jurisdictions are structured to
continuously declare losses while their earnings are stripped out
103
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through management service debts, high interests, technical fees, and
other earnings stripping measures.110 By focusing on the spirit of the
law and adopting the purposive approach to rule interpretation, the
tribunal departed from earlier practices which elevated tax evasion
over tax avoidance. The tribunal went further to equate both terms,
blurring further the thin line between them.
Discussing tax avoidance practices of tax practitioners without
highlighting the economic consequences and impacts on achieving the
SDGs presents a narrow image and undermines the connection with
ethical dilemmas that tax practitioners undergo. Zucman, et. al, argue
that close to forty percent of multinational profits are shifted to tax
havens, reducing corporate income tax revenue by more than $200
billion, or ten percent of global corporate tax receipts. The authors
claim that in 2017 MNEs shifted more than $700 billion in profits to tax
havens, reducing global corporate tax receipts by close to ten
percent.111 These numbers feed into the larger discussion of illicit
financial flows, particularly, the commercial aspects of illicit financial
flows. Rex McHenzie argues that the corruption component of illicit
financial flows accounts for three percent of the global total; the
criminal component accounts for thirty to thirty-five percent of the
global total and the commercial component takes up to sixty to sixtyfive percent of the global total.112 The commercial component of IFFs
includes tax avoidance activities.113
Highlighting further the extent of tax avoidance, especially
using the African continent as case study, a 2008 study by Ndikumana
and Boyce put illicit flows from forty sub-Saharan African countries
between 1970 and 2004 at USD$420 billion in 2004 dollars.114 The
110

Torslov et al., The Missing Profits of Nations, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 24701, 2018).
111
See Vanclay, supra note 79.
112
See generally Rex. A. McKenzie, The Africa Rising Narrative – Whither
Development?, Discussion Paper No. 9 (Kingston U. London, School of Econ., June
2016).
113
The components of IFFs are commercial and manifested in trade mispricing,
transfer mispricing, other base erosion and profit shifting activities, such as thin
capitalization, and tax evasion; criminal component- drugs, arms and human
trafficking, oil and mineral theft; and the corruption component.
114
Léonce Ndikumana & James K. Boyce, New Estimates of Capital Flight from SubSaharan African Countries: Linkages with External Borrowing and Policy Options 6
(U. Mass. Pol. Econ. Rsch. Inst., Working Paper No. 166, April 2008).

2021

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HRIAS

299

Mbeki Report puts the yearly value of IFFs out of Africa at USD$50
billion.115 As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), subSaharan Africa sustains the biggest loss, with IFFs averaging 5.5
percent of GDP, in excess of the global average of 3.9 percent.116
Adopting the claim by the Mbeki Report that Africa loses
conservatively, US$50 billion per annum to illicit financial flows and
applying the lower rate of sixty percent stated by McKenzie,117 to the
US$50 billion, US$30 billion is lost to the commercial component of
illicit financial flows. If twenty percent of the US$30 billion is as a result
of tax avoidance practices by companies, which is a conservative
estimate, US$6 billion would be lost yearly out of Africa as a result of
transfer mispricing.
Focusing the conversation on a country, Nigeria accounts for a
large percentage of the IFFs out of sub-Saharan Africa.118 For example,
Global Financial Integrity (GFI) in 2010 reported that illicit financial
flows out of Nigeria were: USD$6.3 billion in 2000; USD$5.4 billion in
2001; USD$5.1 billion in 2002; USD$9.7 billion in 2003; USD$15 billion
in 2004; USD$18.7 billion in 2005; USD$23 billion in 2006; USD$34.7
billion in 2007; and USD$51.7 billion in 2008.119 At the 2008 estimate of
USD$51.7 billion, transfer mispricing out of Nigeria may amount to
more than USD$6 billion a year. This is significant for a country whose
total yearly budget is under USD$30 billion. Where twenty percent of
potential tax revenue is lost to tax avoidance activities implemented
by tax practitioners, it becomes obvious why meeting the SDGs is
difficult for some countries, notwithstanding their efforts.
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5.1.2. Ethical Considerations for Tax Practitioners
As tax practitioners go about offering advisory services, ethics
play a key role in determining how companies report their tax
liabilities. The ethical underpinnings of tax practitioners influence tax
morale and it is important that this connection is made. Two ethical
principles are of particular relevance to the activities of tax
practitioners. These are: deontology and virtue ethics.
5.1.2.1. Deontology
Deontology denotes a rule-based ethical consideration. This
ethical principle pays less attention to the consequences of one’s
actions120 and elevates one’s adherence or application to a set of rules.
Thus, a deontologist will be justified to act immorally if the action is
backed by rules. For tax practitioners, this provides justification for
carrying out the instructions of their clients, even if those instructions
are immoral and result in grave consequences, where they can justify
compliance with a set of rules.
For instance, the Statement of Taxation Standard (STS) issued
by the Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria (CITN) provides that
when acting for a client, a tax practitioner places his professional
expertise at the disposal of that client and in so doing the member
assumes a duty of care towards the client.121 The STS further provides
that, in addition to the duty owed to the client, the tax practitioner
owes a duty to the tax system. However, it swiftly counters the duty
owed to the tax system by providing that is well established that the
taxpayer has no obligation to pay more tax than legally owed and a tax
practitioner has a duty to assist in achieving that result,122 reinforcing
the Westminster Doctrine. Thus, deontology will justify tax avoidance
activities implemented by tax practitioners on behalf of clients, given
120
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that your primarily and utmost duty is to the client. While this will
appear acceptable to a deontologist, it goes against other ethical
principles such as consequentialism and utilitarianism.
Having said that, recent policies by governments of some
countries in light of the coronavirus pandemic may question such a
narrow view of the scope of the duty to client primacy by tax
practitioners. Countries in the European Union—Poland, Denmark,
etc.— and others outside the EU decided against giving bailout funds
to companies registered in tax havens.123 Considering that one tool of
eroding tax bases and shifting profits out of countries where they are
due is to incorporate the otherwise tax-liable entity in a tax haven, one
would be right to question if it is not in the best interest of the client
for tax practitioners to place the duty to the tax system ahead of the
duty to the client. This is further relevant given that most tax laws have
a general anti-avoidance provision, which covers artificial transactions
and incorporating entities in tax havens to take advantage of loopholes
in the tax laws; as such, making such practices unlawful.
On the other hand, will taxpayers who are unable to benefit
from the bailouts be justified to sue their tax advisers whose advice
encouraged them to incorporate entities in tax havens and has now led
to disqualification from bailouts? Could the tax practitioners be liable
for damages for the breach of contract, professionalism, and
negligence, where their advisory services have resulted in the
bankruptcy of their clients and eventual winding up? This potential
for liability could influence the future acts of tax practitioners when
advising clients. Probably, what is needed going forward is a broader
perspective on the primacy of the duty to the client.
5.1.2.2 Virtue Ethics
Beyond the regard for rules or the concern for consequences of
one’s acts, an important ethical consideration is the moral character of
123
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the individual and its constitution.124 At the center of the
determination of the justification of the acts of the tax practitioner is
the good character or otherwise of the tax practitioner.125 However,
this good character is not natural to man, but a product of nurture.
Where one is not born virtuous and virtue must be acquired
through developing the right habits, then it is arguable that both the
socio-economic environment and the legal system play important roles
in forming a virtuous person. Appreciating the motivation of good
character provides a better understanding of the acts of tax practitioner
as they advise taxpayers.
West, examining MacIntyre’s contemporary virtue ethics,
makes the connection between tax avoidance and Donald Cressey’s
‘fraud triangle’.126 The fraud triangle, per West, stipulates three factors
that must cumulatively be present to influence the character of one:
perceived opportunity, perceived pressure, and rationale.
Opportunity refers to encouraging circumstances to act in a certain
way, for instance, access to accounting records, knowledge that the tax
authority lacks the technical capacity to adequately audit the accounts
of companies as observed in the Mopani’s case where parties to a
dispute had to seek the opinion of Messrs Deloitte and Touche on
whether the transactions between a subsidiary and the parent
company were at arm’s length (discussed below). Pressure refers to
external forces influencing one’s need and can be pecuniary or driven
by firm competition. Rationale implies the intellectual justification for
acting by the tax practitioner, which could be that the act is legal,
protects private property, or is an acceptable global standard. In the
absence of contravening influences, it becomes justifiable to develop
unethical habits which are defensible. And in a world filled with
controversies of what is wrong or right, defining with certainty, what
virtue is in tax practice becomes a difficult task. A question that
remains is what role can law play in establishing virtue ethics in tax
practice?
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Law plays a key role in shaping the habits of all, and in this
context, tax practitioners. However, legislative enactments on taxes
have not been helpful in forming the virtuous character for tax
practitioners. This, as a result of the ambiguous nature of tax laws,
leaves room for ambiguity of which tax practitioners take advantage.
In recent times, the courts have been relied upon to help mold the
character of tax practitioners, through judicial decisions with farreaching implications for tax practice and tax practitioners. A case of
importance is that of Mopani Copper Mines Plc v. Zambia Revenue
Authority.127
In May 2020, the Supreme Court of Zambia, in upholding the
decision of the Tax Appeal Tribunal, held that Mopani Copper Mine
had engaged in abusive transfer pricing with its parent company,
Glencore International AG (GIA) and fined Mopani Copper Mine the
sum of US$13 million for engaging in abusive transfer pricing. This
abusive transfer pricing, Mopani achieved by colluding with its parent
company, GIA, to undervalue the price of copper sold to the parent
company, thereby breaching the arm’s length standard expected of
transactions between related entities. The Supreme Court of Zambia
described the appeal before it as “archetypical of the problem posed to
the fiscus of many developing economies by multinational
corporations engaged in the extractive industry.”128 Identifying the
absence of technical capacity among revenue authorities, which
provides opportunities for tax practitioners to take advantage of gaps
in tax laws for the benefits of their clients, the Supreme Court of
Zambia rejected the argument by the appellant that a report by a firm
of tax practitioners should be binding on the revenue authority. The
court ruled that, “it would be incongruous for a tax authority such as
the respondent to be content with an audit report requested for by a
party so closely related to the taxpayer in a relationship which
naturally arouses suspicion.”129
The decision in Mopani gives further support to the judgment
in the Tanzanian case of African Barrick Gold, where the court ruled
that tax avoidance practices, which may have been considered legal in
the past, would now be deemed to be tax evasion, and as such
considered illegal. The implications of these cases for tax practice are
127
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worth mentioning briefly. First, is the court’s impatience for the
cosmetic distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion, but clear
conclusion that base erosion and profit shifting schemes designed by
tax practitioners for the benefit of their clients, are against the law and
as such, are illegal with attendant consequences for the taxpayers. This
poses a clear departure from the Duke of Westminster doctrine.
Second, is the court’s conclusion that activities of tax practitioners for
their clients should be treated with suspicion, thereby, implying that
the burden of proof in tax matters should be on the tax practitioner.
Third, is the growing judicial activism by courts in African countries,
and other developing countries, which seeks to fill in the gap left by
ambiguous legislative enactments. This judicial activism may be key
to achieving sustainable development by many countries far off the
mark and facing individual and corporate captures, in addition to
weak laws.
Therefore, while a tax practitioner may find rationale to engage
in tax avoidance activities and firm pressure may provide extra
motivation, law can serve to limit the opportunities for such activities,
thereby molding the good character of the virtue ethics proponent. In
the absence of legislative direction, judicial decisions may rise to fill in
the gap.
6.

CONCLUSION

The absence of ethical rules and regulation for all those
involved in human rights impact assessments is detrimental to the
process itself and effectively undermines it. It is clear that the human
rights audit industry may wish to avoid any professionalization, or
adding extra layers of professional regulation, because of its fear of
losing control,130 as well as because ethical regulation entails a higher
degree of cost. However, these are hardly sufficient reasons for the
absence of even the slightest ethical regulation and guidance for the
emerging profession of human rights auditing. The conflation of an
130
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audit’s terms of reference with ethics is no doubt not only the result of
misunderstanding of the role of ethics in the process, but also a
deliberate act that allows audit firms to provide a service to a client
rather than operate in the public interest.
This is one of the major problems with HRIAs. The assessment
of human rights risks was not meant to be profits-driven, or a tool to
weed out risks to the corporation; on the contrary, it was and still is
meant to be rights-oriented and hence serve a public purpose.131 The
absence of ethical guidelines renders auditors complicit in what might
ultimately turn out to be a ‘soft’ box ticking exercise. Where an audit
is predicated on a contractual relationship and which is in the interest
of the audit firm to be long-term, the objectivity of the audit is
questionable where the auditors are not independent from the audit
firm. Put another way, it would be unthinkable for the state to employ
each and every lawyer on its territory yet ask them to represent
accused persons fairly but without confidentiality, professional
privileges, or acting in their best interest. Yet, this is exactly the context
in which human rights auditors perform their duties. We are not
suggesting that there is no place for self-regulation in corporate
accountability or human rights auditing; quite the contrary. Rather,
sensible and best practices from other professions are imperative if
human rights outcomes are to be taken seriously and the aim of audits
is to be aligned with the broader public interest. It is high time that a
task force is established to set out an appropriate code of ethics, as well
as a regulatory entity that monitors adherence to the code for all
human rights auditors.
Tax practitioners, on the other hand, faced with conflicting
rules and absence of legislative clarity, must assume greater
responsibility. This means that it is no longer sufficient to hide under
the cover of legality, but they must consciously seek to comply with
the spirit of law and particularly in light of the human rights standards
voluntarily employed by the corporation in its human rights audit. It
may also be argued that tax practitioners may have to take a utilitarian
approach to their practice, caring more for the collective good,132 as
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opposed to just the strict interests of their client. Finally, if there is any
lesson we have learned from the financial crisis, and now pandemics,
is that everyone looks to the government for a bailout. Thus, when tax
practitioners put their duty to the tax system over that of their clients,
they are not only contributing to the sustainable development of the
jurisdictions where they operate, but also protecting the private
property of their clients.

to act always to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of persons. Id. As
a form of consequentialism, utilitarianism assesses the acceptability of an act by its
benefit to the community or a larger population, not by its conformity to rules. See
Klaus Mathis & Deborah Shannon, Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism, in Efficiency
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